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The Concept of Competitive Contract Law
Hans-W. Micklitz*

I.

The Purpose of the Paper

European contract law has become one of the most fascinating
subjects of legal theory. Thanks to the Commission's Communication'
issued in summer 2001, civil lawyers all over Europe have eagerly
rediscoverd a long-forgotten subject. The Commission is sponsoring an
international group of lawyers which has to develop ground rules on
European contract law.2 For the time being, the Commission is no longer
striving for a full-fledged European Code on Contract Law that would
substitute the national private legal orders. Instead, the Commission is
striving for A Common Frame of Reference3 which could stand side-byside with the national private legal orders and for whose application the
parties are free to opt. The project, however, does not meet unanimous
support and there is a growing critique against the lack of social justice
within the project.4 The mandate, however, is clear and the time
schedule, at least in the eyes of the Commission, is rather tight. Until
2009, the Common Frame of Reference has to be shaped and fueled out
of two different sources of law:
1) a comparative analysis of the different national legal systems and
* University of Bamberg, Germany. I would like to thank Norbert Reich and
Thomas Wilhelmsson for valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1.

See STEFAN GRUNDMANN AND J. STUYCK, AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON

EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, (Kluwer Law International, 2002).

2. The DG SANCO has urged the Van Bar group and the Acquis group to merge,
as it was willing to sponsor one group only. In a way, the Commission has forged a
research cartel. It remains to be seen whether this strategy will weaken the legitimacy of
its findings.
3. Communication on European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: the
Way Forward, COM (04) 651 final.
4. See Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in
European Contract Law: a Manifesto, 10 EuR. LAW. J. 653 (2004); see also Thomas
Wilhelmsson, Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law, 10 EUR. LAW. J. 712
(2004).
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2) a dense analysis of the acquis communautaire.
What to do with the already adopted EC directives and regulations
which form the acquis communautaire? It is commonly known that the
bulk of EC directives in the field of European contract law is consumer
contract law. Despite Directive 2000/35/EC on Late Payment5 and
Directive 86/553/EEC 6 on Commercial Agents, at the end of the day, it is
consumer contract law which lies at the heart of the matter.7 That is why
social justice is at stake. While I sympathize with the "Manifesto," my
interest in writing this paper is different. I would like to I show that
European contract law is far broader than European consumer law and
there is a paradigm behind the regulatory technique which ends up in a
new understanding of the role and function of contract law.8 I would like
to identify three other areas of contract law where the European
1) directives dealing with particular
Community has been active:
services (telecommunication, e-commerce and general services);
2) directives aiming at liberalizing formerly state governed markets
(electricity and gas); and 3) Wettbewerbsvertragsrecht-competition
contract law (vertical agreements). 9 In stark contrast to European
consumer law I would like to term it business contract law.
Setting aside efforts to integrate consumer law into a Common
Frame of Reference, maybe even guided by the intention to downplay
consumer law and its inherent principles which are so alien to traditional
private lawyers all over Europe, the Head of Unit in the Directorate
General for Sant6 et Consommation SANCO, who is in charge of the
overall project, has a clear perspective in mind:' 0
1) An optional model which contains the ground rules in contract law
matters
2) That is accomplished by binding European consumer law rules.
Such a perspective is not far-fetched. It seems realistic with regard
5.
6.

2000 O.J. (L 200) 35.
1986 O.J. (L 382) 17.

7.

See Reiner SCHULZE ET. AL., INFORMATIONSPFLICHTEN UND VERTRAGSSCHLUSS IM

AcQuIs COMMUNAUTAIRE, (Mohr Siebeck, Taibingen 2003).

8. Stefan Grundmann, The optional European Code on the basis of the Acquis
Communautaire-startingpoints and trends, 10 EUR. LAW. J. 698, 704 (2004). "While it
is certainly true that the acquis has gaps, it is much less fragmented that has been
insinuated by virtually every commentator." Id.
9. Another area of interest is public procurement, where competition law and
private law are closely intertwined as well.
10. Personal statement of Dirk Staudenmayer, who is the father of the overall
project, the driving force behind, the coordinator and head of the respective unit in DG
SANCO.
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to the first limb-a Common Frame of Reference on European contract
law-and optimistic with regard to second limb-binding European
consumer law rules. Realistic, because it might be difficult to achieve
consensus over the adoption of a full-fledged European Civil Code.
Optimistic, in that it is not at all clear whether and to what extent
consumer contract law directives, as they stand today, could "survive" a
possible revirement which would be necessary to bring consumer law
rules into compliance with the Common Frame of Reference. In my
view consumer contract rules would have to be amended in at least two

ways. First, it is commonly agreed and widely accepted 1 that changes
should be made with regard to the inner consistency of the rules. A
second and more controversial change, involves the establishment of a
conclusive body of European consumer contract law rules.12 In its last
consumer policy program DG SANCO has already indicated where the
bind blows. 13 Full harmonization of consumer contract law rules instead
of minimum harmonization is the overall message. The debate is gaining4
momentum and is dominating European policy making more and more.1
I will not speculate over future politics. The existing body ofEuropean Consumer Law is "real" and it is subject to constant
development-most importantly by the European Court of Justice. What
I have in mind is:
(1) To look into the inner mechanics of European consumer contract
law, as it stands today and as it will stand probably for a long while;
(2) To demonstrate that steadily and silently a new paradigm in
contract law theory is emerging, a paradigm which I have termed
competitive contract law;
(3) To demonstrate that the concept of competitive contract law
reaches far beyond European Consumer Law-that it is the leading
11. See STEFAN GRUNDMANN, PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN
THE INTERNAL MARKET, (Walter de Gruyter 2001).
12. There is strong critique from the Scandinavian side. See Thomas Wilhelmsson,
Private Law in the EU: Harmonised or Fragmented Europeanisation?,EUR. REV. OF

PRIVATE LAW 77 (2002). But, there is some preparedness at least with regard to
codifying European consumer law. See Walter Van Gerven, Codifying European Private
Law? Yes if... !, EuR. L. REV. 156 (2002).
13. Consumer Policy Strategy, 2002 O.J. (C 137) 2.
14. Thomas Wilhelmsson, European Consumer Law: Thesis of the Tasks of the
Member States; Stephen Weatherill, ConstitutionalAmbiguities in European Consumer

Law: Is Minimum Harmonisation an Oxymoron? [both papers are to be published in:
Hans W. Micklitz (ed.), Verbraucherrecht in Deutschland-Stand und Perspektiven,
Schriftenreihe des VIEW, Band 19, 2005, Nomos, Baden-Baden]; see also Stephen
Weatherill, Why Object to the Harmonisation of Private Law by the EC, EuR. REV. OF

PRIVATE L. 633 (2004).
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philosophy of all European contract law rules; and
(4) To demonstrate that the concept of competitive contract law
might neither be kept away from the Common Frame of Reference on

European contract law, nor-and which might be more importantfrom the Member States' national private legal orders.
I will develop my thesis in four steps: Part II of this paper will
explain what I understand by competitive contract law and why the
paradigm is "new." Part III will define my understanding of European
contract law rules. Part IV will identify the major elements of European
consumer contract law being understood as competitive contract law and
then apply the very same approach to European business contract law.
Lastly, in Part V, I would like to conclude my considerations with some
sort of a stock-taking of where we are in the process of developing
European contract law.
II.

What is "New" in Competitive Contract Law?

Why competitive contract law and what is new in competitive
contract law? I start from the premise that consumer contract law does
not only constitute some eighty percent of European contract law, but
that this European consumer contract law works as a forerunner in
modernizing the national civil legal orders.' 5 There is ample evidence
for such an understanding not only in national private legal orders where
consumer law has become an integral part of the civil code, but also
within the debate over the Common Frame of Reference where the same
thoughts arise. Therefore, consumer law quite necessarily contains to a
large extent what is "new" in contract law. There is, however, an
important second premise. Member States have deliberately delegated
away parts of the competence to adopt consumer contract law rules to the
European Community, so far by means of minimum regulation. Thus,
the new elements do not all derive from nationalconsumer contract law,
but, to a growing extent, from European consumer contract law. The
new phenomena enshrined in consumer law, reappear in European
business contract law as well, which will have to be demonstrated. 6
15. See H. ROSLER, EUROPAISCHES KONSUMENTENVERTRAGSRECHT (CH. Beck
2004).
16. See also, Norbert Reich, The tripartitefunction of modern contract law in
Europe: Enablement, regulation, information, Das Schweizerische Privatrecht im Lichte
des europbischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, Aktuelle Fragen aus dem Haftpflicht und
Vertragsrecht 145-172, 158 (Franz Werro & Thomas Probst eds 2004) (spillover effect of
consumer law to general civil law); Stephen Grundmann, Verbraucherrecht,
Unternehmensrecht, Privatrecht-warum sind

sich

UN-Kaufrecht

und

Kaufrechtsrichtlinieso iihnlich, Archiv fUr civilistische Praxis 202 41-71, 57 (2002).

EU-
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The "New" Cconsumer ContractLaw

Consumer law in the hands of the European Community has
changed its outlook. It is no longer social protection that legitimates
market regulation to fight down imbalance of power, but economic
Despite all
instrumentalisation to establish the Internal Market.
constitutional rhetoric the Internal Market philosophy is still the driving
force behind European integration. Europe is not a state, it is at the very
best a quasi-state with an independent legal order; it may even be
considered "a constitutional charter" as the European Court of Justice has
put it. This is not to blame the process of constitutionalising Europe, but
to show that the governing philosophy behind rule-making in the
European Community, in particular within (consumer) contract law,
results from the Internal Market program. The little-known but highly
influential Sutherland-report 7 has paved the way for upgrading the role
of the consumer in the Internal Market. The consumer plays an active
part in establishing the Internal Market. One may easily attribute to such
a political program a social element-there will or there should be no
Internal Market without a social space-but even a social-orientated
Internal Market cannot hide its roots. It is first and foremost a market
18
that will have to be established inter alia by means of consumer law.
The market bias of consumer contract law has far-reaching
implications on the way in which contract law is conceptualized in that
particular area. There is less room for an understanding of contract law
as an integral part of the "Privatrechtsgesellschaft," which mirrors for the
good and the bad the thinking which lies behind a society which is based
on "rights, property and contract."' 19 European contract law is grounded
in private autonomy,. but its scope is narrower in extent than in general
contract law because it applies to cross-border transactions, is limited to
economic actors enjoying the economic freedoms of the European
Community law, and does not relate to transactions with third
countries. 20 That is why European law is much more market biased than
national contract law. It suffices to recall the importance the ten new
Member States have initially devoted to developing their own national
private legal order.2 ' In the nineties it seemed as if nation building and
17. The Internal Market After 1992 Meeting the Challenge, Eur. Pan. Doc (SEC 92final) 2277 (1992).
18. This is the critique that bears the Social Manifesto.
19. K. Giinter, Ohne weiteres und ganz automatisch? Zur Wiederentdeckung der
Privatrechtsgesell-schaft!,Rechtshistorisches J. 473 (1992); M. Stollies, Auferstanden
aus der Wende: Die biirgerlicheGesellschaft und ihr Recht?, RECHTSHISTORISCHES J. 500
(1992).
20. On the words of Norbert Reich, supra note 17, at 149.
21. See Norbert Reich, TRANSFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW AND CIVIL JUSTICE IN
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private law making were still closely intertwined.22 It is, however,
equally striking that the new Member States quite often have not yet
completed the reform of their national private legal order. Thus, one
may wonder whether the link between Privatrechtsgesellschaft, private
autonomy, and nation state building might loose importance, which
thereby opens the door to a market focused European contract law. By
now, however, contract law in the European Community is just one
device among other areas of law and politics to foster European
integration which means in essence-again and again-to complete the
Internal Market.
The European legal order being understood as a European
Economic Constitution23 cannot overcome the differences in Member
In its ordo-liberal
States' and European contract law making.
grounding 24 the concept is meant to constitutionalise the market
freedoms and the competition rules. This is were private autonomy is
read into market freedoms. However, even an Economic Constitution
enshrined in the Treaty remains bound to a particular purpose-to
European integration. Private autonomy cannot be a full-fledged
constituent element of a "Europdiische Privatrechtsgesell-schaft," because
it does not-yet--exist. Even in a possible social welfare grounding, let
us assume a European Economic and Social Constitution, the concept
readily meets the limits of a European legal order where a "European
state" is missing who could slip into the national social-welfare coat.
The European Community cannot take over the "protective" outlook
consumer law bears in national legal orders, although it often pretends to
do so. Therefore, the European Economic Constitution is deficient at
both ends, private autonomy and social protection. It cannot sustain
without the Member States' legal order, in grounding private autonomy

THE NEW MEMBER STATES COUNTRIES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE BALTIC STATES, HUNGARY

AND POLAND (RGSL, Working Paper No. 21, 2004).
OstW.
Micklitz,
Verbraucherschutz
West
versus
22. Hans
Kompatibilisierungsmdglichkeiten in der Europdischen Gemeinschaft-Einige
Voriuberlegungen, Helmut Heiss (Hrsg.), Briickenschlag zwischen den Rechtskulturen
des Ostseeraums 137 (2001).
23. See Christian Joerges, Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der
Gemeinschaft und die Renaissance der regulativen Politik, R. Wildenmann (Hrsg.),
Staatswerdung Europas, Optionen einer Europiischen Union 254 (1991); translated in
The Market without a State? States without Markets? Two Essays on the Law of the
European Economy (EUI Working Paper Law 1/96, 1996) available at
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-019 and -020.htm; States without a Market. Comments
on the German Constitutional Court's Maastricht-Judgment and a Plea for
InterdisciplinaryDiscourses (NISER Working Paper 1996); Jurgen Basedow, Von der
deutschen zur europiischen Wirtschafisverfassung, Mohr Siebeck, Milnchen (1992).
24. David Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism,
CompetitionLaw and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25 (1994).
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25
and in legitimating social policies.
That is exactly why the Internal Market philosophy remains so
dominant and that is why the European Commission could so easily and
so successfully relate the adoption of the consumer contract law
directives to the Internal Market powers.2 6 European consumer contract
law has been realized in a pick-a-pack procedure, the Internal Market
being the driving force and consumer contract law being no more than an
appendix. The outcome of such a subordinate consumer contract law is
striking. Consumer contract law is turned into a device to contribute to a
higher political objective-that of realizing the Internal Market.
Consumers shall play their part in the Internal Market. They, however,
are able to do so only if they are equipped with the necessary rights and
remedies.
Just like national consumer contract law rules, European consumer
contract law rules continue to undermine "pacta sunt servanda." The
different perspectives, limiting private autonomy to guarantee protection
to the weak and protection-needed consumer2 7 and limiting private
autonomy to create a consumer which is able to play an active part in
completing the Internal Market evoke different notions of "contract law."
European consumer contract law-and this is my leading hypothesisreflects its subordination to the Internal Market philosophy. This will
have to be developed step by step in breaking down the European
approach to regulating contract law into its seven constitutive elements.
The outcome is competitive contract law, because the contract law rules
are shaped so as to allow effective competition between suppliers in the
Internal Market.

B.

The "New" Business ContractLaw
The very same phenomenon, though much less specific, can be

25. There is much discussion in particular on the legitimacy of a European contract
law. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, supra note 14, at 88; Christian Joerges, Zur Legitimitdt
der Europdisierungdes Privatrechts.Uberlegungen zu einem Recht-Fertigungs-Rechtfur
das Mehrebenensystem der EU, in Christian Joerges & Gunther Teubner (Hrsg.),
Rechtsverfassungsrecht 183 (2003), translated in, On the Legitimacy of Europeanising
Private Law: Considerations on a Justice-making Law for the EU Multi-level System,
ELECTRONIC J.OF COMP. L. 7:3 (September 2003), available at http://www.ejcl.org/
ejcl/73/art73-3.html; Ius Commune Lectures on European Private Law 6 (EUI Working
Paper Law 3003/2 2003).
26. See Bettina Heiderhoff, Grundstrukturen des nationalen und europdischen
inbesondere zur reichweite und zur europiiischen
VERBRAUCHERVERTRAGSRECHTS,
auslegung, Sellier, European law Publishers, Miinchen, (2003).
27. For a need-orientated approach, see Thomas Wilhelmsson, SOCIAL CONTRACT
LAW AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, Dartmouth Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore,
Sydney (1995)
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found in European business contract law. The regulatory mechanism and
the regulatory philosophy is identical. While there is no Sutherland
report, which has provided the ground for a consistent policy to
instrumentalise European business law for completing the Internal
Market via active, responsible and circumspect suppliers, most of
European business contract law rules are guided by the same philosophy;
the difference being that consumer contract law is subject related
whereas business contract law is object-related.
The Internal Market Program, more particularly the 1985 "White
Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market," 28 turned out to be the
driving force behind the expansion of European business contract law.
The Commission rediscovered the respective competition rules on public
undertakings in the Treaty, Articles 82 and 86 to initiate deregulation and
There is a strong link between privatization and
privatization.
deregulation of public undertakings and the growing importance of
private law. The most recent initiative is much younger and, again, it
took place in competition law. In the late nineties the European
Commission began to reframe its policy on block exemptions to enhance
competition and most explicitly to strengthen the role of the consumer.2 9
All of these policy fields have one element in common: the Commission
reshapes the market order in particular fields of business by using the
competition articles in the Treaty or its competence to adopt secondary
legislation to reset the competitive environment,-thereby regulating as a
by-product the private law relationship between the parties involved in
the respective transaction.
III. The Existing Body of European Contract Law
Before entering into an analysis of what the elements of competitive
contract law are, it is helpful to define the essence of European consumer
contract law and European business contract law.
A.

Consumer ContractLaw

In a timely order, European consumer contract law 30 consists of
Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising, Directive 85/577/EEC
on contracts concluded away from business premises, Directive
87/102/EEC on consumer credits as amended, Directive 90/314/EEC on
28. COM (85) 310 final.
29. The starting point is the so-called umbrella regulation 2799/2000.
30. Most of the directives are reprinted in three languages--German, English and
French. See Europiiisches Schuldrecht, Verordnungen und Richtlinien, European Law of
Obligations, Regulations and Directives, Droit europren des obligations R~glements et
Directives (Ulrich Magnus ed. 2002).
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package tours, Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer
contracts, Directive 94/47/EC on time sharing, Directive 97/7/EC on
distant selling, Directive 97/55/EC on comparative advertising, Directive
98/27/EC on injunctions, Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales,
Directive 2000/31/EC on e-commerce, Directive 2002/65/EC on distant
selling of financial services, and Directive 2004/39/EC on investment
services. As the Commission starts in its Communication from a broad
concept of contract law one might add the Directive 87/374/EEC on
product liability as amended, the Brussels regulation 44/2001/EC, and
the Rome Convention.
Important legislation is under way, the directive on unfair
commercial practices will probably be adopted in June 2005,31 a
regulation on sales promotion, a draft directive on services, a revision of
the Rome convention (dealing with contracts), and the adoption of Rome
1132 (dealing with tort law) should also occur in the near future. This list
could easily be elongated and, at the very least, shows that the
Commission is continually working hard to draft important legislation.
The legislative machinery does not stop. There is no stand still period
during which the Common Frame of Reference shall and will be
developed. That is why the "acquis communautaire"is steadily growing,
maybe not so much in the field of consumer law where DG SANCO has
proclaimed its intention to publish revisions of the package tour and the
time share directive only, but at the outer end of European contract law,
in fields of the law where the inner link to traditional civil law matters is
less obvious though existent.
For my purposes, it suffices to quite formally classify the existing
body of law in a general part and a specific part. It is said to be formal
because it does in no way consider the differences in the reach and
importance of the directives. The general part consists of the unfair
terms Directive 93/13//EEC and the four directives dealing with selling
modalities (Directive 85/577/EEC on doorstep selling, Directive 97/7/EC
on distant selling, Directive 2000/31/EC on e-commerce and Directive
2002/65/EC on distant selling of financial services). All these directives
commonly start from a horizontal perspective. They are, in theory,
applicable to all sorts of contracts provided they are concluded between a
consumer and a supplier. There specific parts cover all directives that
define particular types of contracts: Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer
credit, Directive 90/314/EEC on package tours, Directive 94/47/EC on

31.
32.

A common position has been reached in November 2004.
See Hamburg Group for Private International Law, Comments on the European

Commission's Draft Proposalfor a Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-

ContractualObligations,67 RabelsZ 1-56 (2003).
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time sharing, Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales, and Directive
85/354/EEC on product liability. Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions falls
apart, although it underpins one characteristic of European contract
law-the close clink between substantive contractual rights and the need
for appropriate remedies. I will come back to this fairly neglected
relationship later on.
Seen in such a perspective European consumer contract law
demonstrates a remarkable consistency, which results from the first and
the second European consumer policy program.3 3 Legal doctrine likes to
use metaphors to describe the existing state of European contract law,
such as mere islands in the deep and dark sea of contract law, a mosaic of
legal rules, or a puzzle. I do not fully share such a sotto voce pejorative
finding. While it is true that European consumer law rules lack
consistency, it suffices to recall the differences in the shaping of
information rights and the deviating periods for the execution of the right
to withdrawal. European consumer contract law rules form a relatively
close body of rules which mirror the major policy problems of the last
two decades, and, what is much more important for the purpose of this
paper, the rules suffice to identify the key elements of a new paradigm in
contract law theory which is not bound to consumer law alone.
B. Business ContractLaw
At first hand sight, there are only two directives which are normally
attributed to regulating contract law in B2B relations, Directive
86/553/EEC on commercial agents and Directive 2000/35/EC on late
payment. These two directives, however, do not constitute European
34
business law! In order to liberalize the market for insurance services,
job employment,35 telecommunication, energy (electricity and gas) and
transport (aviation, railway, public transport), the Commission has
developed a mixed approach which consists of firstly applying the
competition articles of the Treaty to break off the market and secondly to
regulate and shape the so opened markets via secondary EC legislation.
The different pieces of secondary legislation are dealing inter alia with
contractual relations.
Passing the last twenty years in review (since the adoption of the
33. The Commission is constantly reviewing its policy, the name is sweeping
between action plan, new impetus, new impulse etc. The basic ideas, however, are still to
be found in the first two consumer programmes; 1975 O.J. (C 92) and 1981 O.J. (C 133).
34. While insurance contracts might be a good testing field, it will be set aside as it
is governed by particular rules, which are difficult to compare. See Jurgen Basedow &
Till Fock (Hrsg), Europaisches Versicherungsrecht,Band 1 und 2 (2002) Mohr Siebeck,
Tilbingen, (show the particularities of EC insurance law).
35. See Case C-41/90, Hofner, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979.
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White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market), the Commission
set the tone in the way in which it regulated the telecommunication
sector. Directive 89/522/EEC,3 6 preparing the ground for Directive
2002/21/EC37 and Directive 2002/22/EC 38 on universal services, worked
39
as a blueprint for regulating the e-commerce in Directive 2000/3 1/EC
and the draft proposal on services, 40 which is meant to become an
umbrella regulation for all those services which are not covered by
particular EC secondary law rules. The three directives are to be
characterized by a strange-seen from a continental lawyer's
perspective-mixture of public (competition) and private (contract) law
to lay down ground rules for a market of telecommunication services, of
e-commerce services and of all remaining services outside particular EU
rules. This should, ideally, guarantee free access to the Internal Market
for new competitors, which could be done by breaking down national
public monopolies in the telecommunication sector, or by setting aside
national barriers to get access to particular professions in the draft
directive on services, or by framing ground rules on newly emerging
markets such as in the e-business. Public law historically sets a
regulatory frame and private law historically gets the already established
market going. Emphasis is certainly put on public law rules, mainly on
competition law even if it appears in a new device. However, the three
directives, the telecommunication Directive 89/522/EEC read together
with Directives 2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC, the E-Commerce Directive
2001/31/EC and the draft proposal on services, contain to a varying
degree provisions shaping directly or influencing indirectly contract
making in B2B relations as well as in B2C relations.
The telecommunication sector was the first to be privatized in the
aftermath of the adoption of the Single European Act. Thus, in a way,
Directive 89/522/EEC served as a pattern to deregulate the energy
market, such as electricity and gas, and maybe even the water supply in
36. Council Directive (89/552/EEC) on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the
Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298), amended by Directive
97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Directive
89/552/EEC on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television
Broadcasting Activities, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 60.
37. 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33.
38. 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51.
39. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of on
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter Directive on
Electronic Commerce].
40. Proposal for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market, COM (04) 2 (SEC
04) 21.
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the near future. The commonality between all three of these sectors is
that the Commission has an established policy of separating the
transmission system from the distribution system, which enables
particular cross-border competition in between operators of the
transmission system and in between operators of the distribution system.
The most recently revised directives, Directive 2003/54/EC 4 1 on
electricity and Directive 2003/55/EC 42 on gas, pay tribute to the
difficulties the Commission faces in arriving at a fully operational and
competitive internal market. The primary addressee of the two directives
are the Member States through their competent regulatory agencies.
These are entrusted powers, which have to be regarded as regulatory
powers similar to competition rules, all meant to open up the
transmission and distribution system, to unbundling the systems and to
organize and grant access to the systems. That is why the two directives
are usually seen as regulatory means outside contract law. This is,
however, only half the truth. Indirectly, the two directives affect private
law relations on the energy market. This comes particularly clear in the
rules which are meant to guarantee customer-not consumerprotection. Here, Member States are requested to guarantee a minimum
standard of choice and fair contract conditions, not only to consumers,
but also to customers as such.43 Regulation 1228/200344 on conditions
for access to the network for cross border exchanges in electricity as well
as its counterpart in the gas sector, which has not yet been adopted,45 are
both meant to promote the cross-border trade in electricity and gas. They
define fair, cost-reflective, transparent rules, which are directly
applicable. In essence the two regulations affect the way in which the
parties to such a cross-border trade are allowed to shape (calculation) and
to present (the conditions of price shaping) their prices. Theoretically the
two domains, competition and civil law are kept separate; in practice
they are closely intertwined.
Last but not least, reference should be made to the most recent
initiative of the Commission to review its policy on block exemptions.
Here, similar tendencies may be reported. Block exemptions are a well
41. Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council Concerning
Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 96/22/EC
2003, O.J. (L 176) 37.
42. Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and the Council Concerning
Common Rules for the Internal Market in Gas and Repealing Directive 98/30/EC, 2003
O.J. (L 176) 57.
43. Primary addressee seems to be the final consumer. Article 3(5), however, refers
to Annex A as follows: "as regards at least household customers, i.e. the addressee is not
only the final consumer but also the customer."
.44. 2003 O.J. (L 176) 1.
45. COM (04) 760 final.

2005]

THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVE CONTRACT LAW

established means used by the Commission to shape the borderlines of
vertical agreements by means of competition law.
The diverse
regulations on exclusive and selective distribution, the umbrella
regulation 2790/1999,46 the regulation 1400/200247 on the car sector, and
the regulation 772/200448 on technology transfer, however, intervene
indirectly into contract-making and indirectly, because the parties to the
vertical agreement are free to define their contractual relations. In
practices, however, the content of the rights and duties in vertical
agreements is determined by the block exemptions. The parties will even
literally copy the articles in the block exemptions into their contracts to
avoid discrepancies between the EC rules and the contractual rights.49
IV. The Key Elements of Competitive Contract Law
I would like to distinguish seven elements which may be drawn
from European consumer law: 1) the protective-instrumental device,
2) commercial communication and conclusion of contract, 3) competitive
and contractual transparency, 4) standard form contracts via information
duties, 5) fairness as market clearance, 6) post contractual cancellation
rights and 7) effective legal protection. 50 These elements will be
analyzed by first taking into consideration the existing body of consumer
law, before the very same findings may be contrasted with similar or
identical developments in European business contract law.
A.

The Protective-InstrumentalDevice

It is a common characteristic of EC law dealing with B2C or B2B
relations that the dispersed rules are dominated by a particular regulatory
perspective. It is not contract law such as which is submitted to EC law,
but contract law is used in a particular way by the EC regulator to

46. 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21.
47. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 on the Application of Article
81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerned Practices in the
Motor Vehicle Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30.
48. 2004 0.J.(L 123) 11.
49. Stephen Grundmann, EUROPAISCHES SCHULDVERTRAGSRECHT, Walter de
Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 936 (1999); T. Schumacher, RECHT DES KFZ-VERTRIEBS IN
EUROPA, CH. Beck, Miincehn, (2005).
50. The distinction is based on previous research, I have undertaken in the field of
competitive contract law. Perspektiven eines europdischen Privatrechts-IusCommune
Praeter Legem?, ZEuP 257-273 (1998); The New German Sales Law-Changing
Patterns on the Regulation of Product Quality, J. OF CONSUMER POL'Y 379-401 (2002);
Der Vertragsbegriffin den ibereinkommen von Briissel und Rom, in Reiner Schulze &
Hans Schulte-N6lke in Verbindung mit L. Bernardeau (Hrsg.), Europiisches
Vertragsrecht im Gemeinschaftsrecht, Schriftenreihe der EuropaischenRechtsakademie
Trier, Herausgeberder Schriftenreihe, Wolfgang Heusel, 39-83 (2002).
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achieve a particular purpose, mainly with regard to open up markets or to
enhance competition. That is why EC contract law rules maybe
characterized as being "instrumental" and "protective."
European consumer law is not primarily meant to protect the weaker
party, in the sense given to it by most private national legal orders. The
instrumentalisation of consumer contract law to complete the Internal
Market, however, does not mean that consumer law is entirely deprived
of its protective device. It is the direction of protection which differs
from national law. This is where consumer protection law is being
understood as a necessary element of the social welfare state thinking.
Consumers are regarded as being per se in an underprivileged situation
when it comes down to conclude a contract. The European legislator
uses the protective-device only as a mere starter or even worse as a
pretext to pursue the overall concept of European integration, more
specifically to realize the Internal Market. 5' This is why it might be
correct to speak of a "protective-instrumental" device. The means to be
used are similar, the substance, however, is different. The differences
maybe condensed in the debate around the role and function of the socalled "Verbraucherleitbild." The European legal order starts from a
normative concept under which the average consumer is idealized as
being "responsible and circumspect." The rights and remedies granted
are shaped along the line of such a fictitious figure, at a time where
"information economics" and "behavioural economics" is beginning to
take into consideration how consumers really behave. 2 In the ideal
world of a responsible and circumspect consumer, the true needs of
protection fall apart. Thus, there is a growing conflict between the
normative concept of the consumer in the European legal order and the
factual concept still in existence in a number of Member States. The
former is market bound, the latter is social policy bound. The strive for
maximum harmonization in combination with the country of origin
principle provides evidence that EC consumer law is, more than ever,
focusing on the overall dimension of completing the Internal Market, but
not-and how can it be-the formation of a European
Privatrechtsgesellschaft.
European business contract law starts from the same premise. This
means that a protective device may be identified. It may be more or less
51. That is why Thomas Wilhelmsson has identified an abuse of the concept of
confident consumer. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Abuse of the "Confident Consumer"
as a Justificationfor EC Consumer Law, 27 JCP 317-337 (2004).
52. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics,
92 THE Am. ECONOMIC REV. 460 (2002); Andreas Oehler, Behavioural Finance,
Theoretische, empirische und experimentelle Befunde unter Marktrelevanz, OBA 978
(2000).
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explicit. Directive 86/553/EEC5 3 on self-employed commercial agents
serves as a starter. The intention was to provide the self-employed
commercial agents with mandatory rights to claim remuneration from the
principal.
Directive 2000/35/EC was meant to fight down late payment which
place "heavy administrative and financial burdens on business,
particularly small and mediums seized ones. 54 The same thinking might
be found in recital 2 of Directive 2004/54/EC on electricity and Directive
2004/55/EC on gas which runs as follows: 55 "concrete provisions are
needed to ensure ...that the rights of small and vulnerable customers
are protected. . ." (emphasis added). Newcomers in the market, this is
the regulatory philosophy, need to be protected to be able to play their
role in a more competitive market. Recital 9 of regulation 1400/2002 on
vertical agreements and concerted prices in the motor vehicles directives
says: 56 "In order to strengthen the independence of distributors and
repairers from their suppliers ...." That means distributors and repairers
are not regarded as per se weak, but only with regard to a particular
perspective, i.e., within the field of vertical agreements where they are
said to need regulatory protection to fulfill the mission, the Commission
would like to see realized. The umbrella regulation 27/1999 and the
regulation 772/2004 on technology transfer do not contain similar
outspoken statements on the potential addressees.
There seems to be a common policy behind the directives and
regulations. They all refer to an image of business which is not too far
away from the protective-instrumental device in consumer related
matters, thereby following the blueprint of the commercial agents
directive. Again, there is this obvious intention of the European
Commission to provide rights to an identified group of businesses in
order to make them use their rights in a very particular way, i.e., to open
up the Internal Markets or to keep it open. It presupposes that those
addressed, i.e., small and medium seized business, are able, competent
and circumspect to make use of their rights. As in consumer law, the
concept of business is a normative one.

53. 1986 O.J. (L 382) 17.
54. 7 th Recital ofDirective 2000/35/EC.
55. Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council Concerning
Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 96/22/EC,
2003 O.J. (L 176) 37.
56. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of3l. July 2002 on the Application
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerned
Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 31.
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B. Advertising, Pre-contractualInformation and Contract Conclusion
The European directives and regulations at stake here constantly
repeat the "credo" that the European rules do not intervene into national
private legal orders which still determine the interplay of offer and
acceptance and the moment at which the contract is concluded. The
Commission failed to regulate contract making in the e-commerce
directive, where it had in mind to install the so-called double click
procedure which would have Europeanized offer and acceptance. This
domain is seen as being in the realm of the Member States' competence.
Such a reading, however, of the EC law is not correct and actually is
misleading.57 European directives and regulations, mostly in consumer
law, really downgrade the function and the importance of offer and
acceptance in contract law. In EC law, rules, advertising, pre-contractual
information, and contract making are legally not clearly separated-they
are interlinked. Therefore, it is more correct to start from the premise
that under EC law, advertising, pre-contractual information, contractmaking, and even post contractual duties are regarded as a continuum,
where the moment at which the contract is concluded looses importance.
In so far EC law is liquefying contract law. The same tendencies,
although less outspoken, might be identified in the field of business
contract law.
The Commission has always used the emergence of new
technologies to introduce new regulatory techniques in consumer law
which might turn into a common trend. It did so in the field of the
information technologies where Directive 97/7/EC on distant selling,
Directive 2001/31/EC on e-commerce, and Directive 2002/65/EC on
distant selling of financial services set the tone. At the same time
advertising, or in EC jargon "commercial communication" became a
favorite field of EC action to shape inter alia contract law, which is
legitimated by the overall need to strive for common rules in the Internal
Market to set aside barriers to trade resulting from different marketing
standards.
The first technique to downplay offer and acceptance is to
Europeanize the invitatio ad offerendum via pre-contractual information
duties which are imposed on the supplier prior to the conclusion of the
contract. The policy can be traced back to the door step selling directive
and has been more fully developed in the general distant selling
directive, the e-commerce directive, and the directive on distant selling
of financial services. The supplier, therefore, is obliged to provide the
consumer with basic information on products and services if they are
57.

See Reich, supra note 16, at 149.
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subject to particular selling arrangements outside business premises or
subject to the use of particular communication means. There might even
exist a general duty to disclose information.5 8
The second technique is closely linked to the particular European
understanding of the inter-relationship between trade practices law and
contract law. There is good reason to conclude that Directive
84/450/EEC on misleading advertising imposes an information-like duty
on the supplier contrary to most of the legal orders of the Member States,
59
at least in the meaning given to it by the European Court of Justice.
The two pieces under way, the common position on unfair commercial
practices and the draft regulation on sales promotion, push the
development even one step further. Whereas the draft regulation might
set up scrutinized information obligations, the common position on
unfair commercial practices comes close to the Scandinavian tradition
which imposes information duties on the advertiser in prohibiting
Europe-wide misleading omissions. The borderline between omission
and action is sweeping and so is the difference between a prohibition not
to mislead the consumer via unfair omissions and the duty to provide
information.6 °
In European business contract law, the very same tendency can be
recognized, although the existence of information duties which intervene
into commercial communication remains very much context-related.
Nevertheless, pre-contractual information duties are becoming more
and more common. It remains to be recalled that the e-commerce
Directive 2000/3 1/EC is equally applicable to B2B relations. Article's 5
and 6 impose information duties on the service provider in the precontractual stage. Article 9 obliges the member States to ensure that the
legal requirements applicable to the contractual process neither create
obstacles for the use of electronic contracts nor result in such contracts
being deprived of legal effectiveness and validity on account of their
having made by electronic means. This very broad rule might allow the
European Court of Justice to decide when an electronic contract does or
61
does not exist.
Specific pre-contractual information duties may likewise be found
58. See infra Part IV.G.
59. Norbert Reich & Hans W. Micklitz, Europdisches Verbraucherrecht,4 Auflage,
2003, Nomos, Baden-Baden, § 6.10.
60. Hans W. Micklitz & J. KeBler, EuropdischesLauterkeitsrecht-dogmatischeund
6konomische Aspekte einer Harmonisierungdes Wettbewerbsverhaltens im europdischen
Binnenmarkt, GRUR INT. 885-901 (2002); Hans W. Micklitz & J. KeBler, Die
Harmonisierung des Lauterkeitsrechts in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europiischen
Gemeinschaft und die Reform des UWG, Band 12, VIEW Schriftenreihe (2003), Nomos,
Baden-Baden.
61. See Reich, supra note 16, at 150.
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in the telecommunication and the energy sector. Directive 2002/22/EC
obliges the addressed companies to provide the "subscriber ' 62 with
information on the control of the expenditure, Article 10 together with
Annex I; or the "consumer," respectively, the "end-user '63 with
information on the content of the contract, Article 20 and Article 21 with
Annex II. Similar rules may be found in the Directive 2003/54/EC and
Directive 2003/55/EC, respectively the annex; on common rules for the
They contain outspoken
internal market on electricity and gas.
provisions on the electricity and gas suppliers' duties to provide basic
contractual information in promotional materials to final customers that
64
are meant to be household customers and non-household customers.
Last but not least, the different block exemptions have to mentionedwhere information duties can be detected.
The relationship between commercial practices and contract law
seems to be less tight. This might be due to the fact that the European
Commission has now started to separate B2C commercial practices law
from B2B commercial practices law. The common position on unfair
commercial practices does not cover B2B relations. Directive 84/450/EC
on misleading advertising, however, remains applicable to all type of
relations notwithstanding the status of the addressee. That is why the
rulings of the European Court of Justice, whether along the line of
Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty of Rome or along the line of the concept
of "misleading advertising" in Directive 84/450/EEC, are, in principle,
applicable to B2B relations as well. So far, the Court has not yet had an
opportunity to dwell on possible differences between consumers and
suppliers to the degree in which they may be mislead by insufficient or
An extension of the project on unfair
non-existent information.
commercial practices to B2B relations would considerably enhance the
impact of European trade practices law on European contract law. The
Commission has left the door open to take that step at a later stage.
C. Competitive and ContractualTransparency
The transparency principle bears a twofold connotation: 1) it is
related to the bilateral relationship between the parties to the contractthis is what I would like to term contractualtransparency, and 2) it is
related to the multilateral relationship of all those possible consumers
62. As defined in Art. 2 (k) Directive 2002/21/EC (any natural person or legal entity
who or which is party to a contract with the provider of publicly available electronic
communication services for the supply of such services).
63. End-user means a user not providing public communication networks or publicly
available electronic communication services. Directive 2002/2 1/EC, Art. 2 (n).
64. A final customer is per definitionem not only the private consumer but a
business party who consumes the energy. See id. at Art. 2 No. 9.
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who would like to benefit from the transparency in making a full-fledged
decision-this is what I would like to term competitive transparency.
This distinction is equally found in B2C and B2B relations.
Transparency is much less context-related, it turns out to become a
generally applicable principle notwithstanding its reference in secondary
Community law. Such a principle governs the continuum of contract
making in EU law. It determines the way in which pre-contractual
information duties are provided, it might even have an impact on
advertising and sales promotion as far as they cover information which
has to be disclosed or transmitted to the consumer or to the supplier.
Competitive transparency is deeply routed in competition law. The
idea here is to establish equal conditions for all competitors to guarantee
effective competition. What is much less developed is the role and
function competitive transparency might and should play with regard to
consumers. While the European Court of Justice has most recently, in
Courage,65 reopened the debate on the relationship between competition
law and consumer protection, the more innovative impact results from
secondary law making-in the context of contract making which
includes, to my understanding, the different directives on unfair and
misleading commercial practices. Since its insertion in Article's 4 and 5
of the unfair terms Directive 93/13/EEC, the transparency principle has
made its way in the consumer contract law directives and more strikingly
in the unfair market practices rules. It suffices to look into the draft
regulation on sales promotion. After all, the transparency principle can
be regarded as a well-established legal principle, reaching even beyond
the particular context of a consumer contract law directive.
In Cofinoga,66 the European Court of Justice explicitly recognized
the twofold function of the transparency principle. Thus, it has clarified
The
the relationship between transparency and information.
transparency principle provides criteria on the way in which the
information has to be given-with regard to the contracting partner and
with regard to interested consumers. Its impact is far reaching as it is
applicable to all sorts of information which has to be made available to
consumers. Along the line of the Directive 2002/65/EC on distant selling
of financial services, three types of information might be distinguished:
information on the supplier, on the service and on the contract. The
standards to be applied under an all-embracing transparency principle are
the same, lower in that the information standards remain less explicit
65. Case C-453/99, Courage v. Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. 1-6297; K. J. Cseres,
Competition Law and Consumer Law: A Love-Hate Relationship (2004) (Ph.D. Thesis,

University of Utrecht).
66. Case C-264/02, Cofinoga Mrignac SA v. Sylvain Sachithanathan, 2004 E.C.R.,
I-nnv.
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with regard to the three-fold distinction and higher in that the
information provided must meet the particular challenge of competitive
transparency.
An example might serve to explain what is meant. The supplier has
to inform the consumer on the price of the product or services. This is
particularly sensitive in the field of services. The classical legal
distinction would be:
1.Price information in advertising or sales promotion-general
provisions in the draft regulation on sales promotion and the draft
directive on unfair commercial practices; more particular rules in the
distant selling directives;
2. Price information prior to the conclusion of the contract via price
indication or price information-no general rules on price indication
for services. However, particular rules in diverse service related
consumer contract law directives; and
3. Price information at the time of the conclusion of the contract
either in writing or on a durable medium-particular rules in diverse
service related consumer contract law directives.
An overall transparency principle enshrines all three stages of
contract making both in a bilateral and a multilateral dimensionbilateral with regard to the possible contracting party and multilateral
with regard to possible interested persons who ask for information to be
able to compare the price of products and services.
The principle of transparency has been equally codified in the three
directives on telecommunication, energy and services. They are much
less explicit in the regulations on block exemptions, although the
establishment of a transparent framework has always been of major
concern for the European Commission. Otherwise competition would
not be enhanced but hampered.
The principle of transparency is the governing rule in e-commerce
Directive 2000/31/EC and will be introduced in the project on a general
directive on services. Directive 2002/22/EC on universal services and
the two directives, Directive 2004/54/EC and Directive 2004/55/EC on
common rules for an internal market on electricity and gas, have even
upgraded the role of transparency-in particular with regard to
transparent tariffs for access to electricity or gas networks or with regard
with to transparent tariffs on electronic communication services. 67 These
67. Recital 13 and 14 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and the
Council Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing
Directive 96/22/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 37; Recitals 4 and 14 of Commission Regulation
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provisions express literally the dual character of the transparency
principle. Information on tariffs should be disclosed prior to the
conclusion of the contract, to enhance competition and to put all parties
concerned on an equal footing when it comes down to concluding the
contract. It is tempting to argue that the principle is context-bound. On
the other hand, tariffs and price shaping constitute "the" decisive feature
in contract making as the quality of the products do not vary to a great
extent. Thus, the principle of transparency governs the internal market
on gas and electricity.
D. Standardizing ContractMaking
While there is a common trend in both fields of contract law, the
In consumer contract law, contracts are
strategy is different.
standardized indirectly via information duties.68 The same approach
exists in business law, however, -the block exemption regulations
intervene more directly into the way in which the contract should be
shaped. Within its recent communication on European contract law, the
European Commission is advocating for the elaboration of standard
business conditions in B2B relations and in business to public authorities
obligation, but not in B2C relations.69
It is common knowledge that the European Community has partly
reversed the responsibilities on information supply in consumer
contracts. In consumer contracts, which are concluded by electronic
means, the consumer is free from seeking the necessary information.
The consumer can rely on the suppler, which the directives have imposed
a remarkable set of information duties. The situation, however, is.
different in the consumer sales' Directive 99/44/EC, where the consumer
remains responsible for bringing the necessary information together.
voluntary guarantees
More specific information duties in particular via
70
States.
Member
the
from
approval
the
did not get
The way in which the information duties in Directive 2002/65/EC
on the distant selling of financial services are grouped together might be
path-breaking. The threefold distinction, supplier related information,
product/service related information and contract related information,
No. 1228/2003 on Conditions for Access to the Network for Cross-border Exchanges in
Electricity, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 1; Recital 3 and 31 Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal
Service and User's Right to Electronic Communications Networks and Services 2002
O.J. (L 108) 51 [hereinafter Universal Services Directive].
68. This goes back to the famous Cassis-de Dijon judgment. See Reich, supra note
16, at 162.
69. See COM (04) 651 final at 6-9.
70. See Christian Twigg-Flesner, CONSUMER PRODUCT GUARANTEES (Ashgate,
Aldershot, Burlington 2003).
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can easily be transferred to the consumer contract law directives already
adopted, as well as be used for a more general concept of information
supply in consumer contracts.7'
What really matters in my context, however, is not so much the
diversity of information, but its consequences for contract making. Even
a wilful supplier faces considerable differences to fully meet the
information standards in areas, where the requirements differ although
the marketing strategies for which the information is used are closely
intertwined. It suffices to compare the information requirements on
direct marketing strategies with those on distant marketing strategies. In
commenting on the distant selling directive we have tried to develop a
standard information format.72 This was not only a challenging task, it
was, at the same time, a striking self-experience as we realized that we
ended up shaping a standard format on distant selling. The European
Commission is far ahead in that it had proposed as early as 1976 a
standard formula on notifying the consumer on his right to withdrawal in
The German
contracts concluded away from business premises.
legislator went down exactly that way in 2002 after painful experiences,
when it introduced such a standard format to the benefit of the consumer
and the supplier. The shaping of the notification requirements have been
subject to an endless stream of judgments.
The European Commission is advocating for the development of
standard format contracts on a voluntary basis though. The results, in the
field of package tours and time sharing, are not promising, however. On
the other hand, there are limits to standardizing consumer contracts.
They result from possible anti-competitive effects, in case standardizing
consumer contracts leads to standardized consumer products and
consumer services. Insurance contracts are one notable example.73
In business contract law, two distinct strategies can clearly be
distinguished. On the one hand, the European legislator imposes
information duties on the parties to a B2B contract. On the other hand,
the whole contract is predetermined under the disguise of setting a
common European frame for enhanced competition in particular policy
fields.
It lasted until the adoption of the e-commerce Directive, Directive
2000/31 /EC, before information duties turned into a common element of
B2B contract making. The very same approach is easily identifiable in
Directive 2002/12/EC on universal services and in the draft directive on
71. See R6sler, supra note 15.
72. See Hans W. Micklitz & Klaus Tonner, Vertriebsrecht,Handkommentar [The
Law on Distributition-Hand Comment] 284-289 (2002), Nomos, Baden-Baden.
73. See Art. 6 of Regulation EC No. 358/2003 of the Commission on the Application
of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty in the Insurance Sector, 2003 O.J. (L 53) 8.
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services. In the privatization directives the starting point was different,
maybe with the exception of Directive 89/522/EEC. A new market was
to be created, enabling newcomers to benefit from competition where it
did not exist before. Therefore, information is premature as the legislator
pointed out in recital 2 of the electricity directive, "concrete provisions
are needed to ensure ... that information on energy sources for
electricity generation is disclosed as well as reference
74 to sources, where
available, giving information on their environment.,
The set of information made available is then specified all over the
directives with regard to the production and distribution of energy. Quite
detailed rules have been adopted addressing the transmission and the
distribution systems operator.
The different regulations on block exemptions claim not to infer
into private law making. As has already been explained, quite the
contrary is true. It appears safe to conclude that private autonomy is
severely restricted under the garment of competition law. The block
exemptions have been led and will yield standardized vertical
agreements and technology agreements whenever the block exemptions
apply.
The most recent initiative of the European Commission on standard
business conditions has not yet lead to tangible results. The Commission
has in mind to set up a website to promote the development and use of
EU wide STC (standard terms and conditions). The website invites
market participants to exchange information. The relationship of STC's
with competition law needs to be clarified. The Commission has not yet
published guidelines on how to meet EU cartel law.75 It has withheld the
right to submit STC's to European cartel law. However, the Commission
intends to examine, together with interested parties, what legislative
obstacles to EU-wide STC exist in the Member States, with a view to
eliminating them where needed and appropriate. All in all the whole
process is still at an infant stage.7 6

74. Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council Concerning
Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 96/22/EC,
2003 O.J. (L 176) 37.
75. It refers, however, to its Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC
Treaty to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, Commission Note No. 200 1/C3/02, 2001
O.J. (C 3) 2.
76. Hugh Collins, The Freedom to Circulate Documents: Regulating Contracts in
Europe, 10 EUR. L.J. 787 (2004) (Mr. Collins pleads for an essential fifth element for a
modem market to operate efficiently and competitively, the freedom to circulate
documents, comprising standard form contracts).
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E. Fairnessas Market Clearance
Fairness of contract law is easily associated with fairness in
consumer contracts. Fairness, here, deals with the question of whether
the parties have struck a fair balance between the rights and duties or
whether one party, usually the supplier, takes advantage of his
superseding power to influence the contract terms to his advantage. The
same issue appears in B2B relations, usually between bigger companies
on the one side and small and medium sized companies on the other.
However, in the context of my analysis a new issue appears, resulting
from the Commission's policy to open up markets. The competitive
newcomers must be granted access to the market and the conditions to be
met are linked to the concept of fairness. The terminology used in the
privatization directives, however, is different. Access to the market must
be discrimination free, transparent and at fair costs.
Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms has introduced the principle of
good faith, which is far from being commonly accepted in the Member
States. There is no room and no need to discuss the intricacies of the
good faith principle and its relationship to different legal tradition and
legal cultures. It means, in essence, to control the substance of the
contract if it is laid down in standard contract terms, maybe even to some
extent in individual contract terms.77 In a European perspective, the
indicative list of prohibited contract terms seems of utmost importance.
It provides an overall yardstick of control, which is relatively easily
accessible even for Member States which face difficulties in applying the
good faith test in practice. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the
respective enforcement authorities are using the "black list" of prohibited
contract terms to clear the market. This is what the Office of Fair
Trading, a late comer in the unfair contract term business, has been doing
over the last years. In essence, Directive 93/13/EEC has harmonized the
conditions under which suppliers might get access to a European law
determined process of contract making.
The regulatory approach, first adopted with regard to unfair terms in
consumer contracts, has equally been applied to insurance contracts.
Regulation 358/2002 contains a whole set of contract terms for which the
block exemption, with regard to standard contracts, does not apply. To
me the non-exempted contract terms in the Regulation must be
understood as being equally unfair in the sense of Directive 93/13/EEC.
Outside insurance contracts, there are provisions to be found in most of

77. The German legal culture binds the control to standard business conditions, the
common law and the Scandinavian countries to the imbalance of power, i.e.,
notwithstanding whether the contract terms have been individually negotiated or not.
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the consumer contract law directives, which might easily be read so as to
prohibit certain market practices. 78 If these provisions are contractrelated, they do not distinguish between standard contract terms and
individual terms, as is the case in the directive 99/44/EC on consumer
goods.
A further step towards market clearance will probably result from
the adoption of the directive on unfair commercial practices. The
regulatory approach of the envisaged directive on unfair marketing
practice is similar if not identical to the unfair contract terms Directive
93/13/EEC. The general verdict put on unfair commercial practices is
concretized by way of an annex in which incriminated marketing
strategies are blacklisted. The effects of the unfair commercial practices
directive might therefore be comparable to those of the unfair terms
directive. The common law countries, but not these countries alone, will
face difficulties in applying the general clause, although the key concept
behind is not "good faith," but "unfairness., 79 The very same countries,
however, will be happy to have the list of incriminated commercial
practices which will facilitate enforcement.
In European business contract law there is no general principle of
fairness, not even restricted to the control of unfair (standard) contract
terms. However, it is striking to see that the privatization directives have
established the principle of discrimination-free access to the net, which
shall facilitate the conclusion of the contract. The first steps have been
taken in Directive 2002/12/EC on universal services. Annex VIII gives
shape to the conditions under which the net must be opened to
competitors. The three principles, non-discrimination, cost-orientation
and transparency have become the common credo, now governing all
net-bound services. In the words of Directive 2003/54/EC:
Recital 7: In order to complete the internal electricity market, nondiscriminatory access to the network of the transmission or the
distribution system operator is of paramount importance
Recital 14: In order to facilitate the conclusion of contracts....
Member States and, where appropriate, national regulatory
authorities should work towards more homogenous conditions and
the same degree of eligibility for the whole of the internal market.
The anti-discrimination principle is supplemented by the principle of
78. Market practices are meant to cover unfair contract terms and unfair commercial
practices (unfair and misleading advertising).
79. Hans W. Micklitz & Jurgen Keller (eds.), Marketing PracticesRegulation and
Consumer Protection in the EC Member States and the US, Band 10, VIEW
SCHRIFTENREIHE (2002), Nomos, Baden-Baden.
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fair-pricing for cross-border tarification and the allocation of available
interconnection capacities. 8 °
Recital 4: Fair, cost-reflective, transparent and directly applicable
rules, taking into account a comparison between efficient network
operators from structurally comparable areas.., should be
introduced with regard to cross-border tarification and the allocation
of available interconnection capacities, in order to ensure effective
access to transmission systems for the purpose of cross-border
transactions.
The hardcore restrictions in the block exemptions are similar to the
indicative list of incriminated unfair terms in Directive 93/13/EEC or
unfair commercial practices in the envisaged directive.
Hardcore
restrictions shall disappear from the market. While these restrictions
have been adopted under the competition garment, they are equally
important in private law relationships. There would be a lot to say in
favor of regarding hardcore restrictions as unfair contract terms-if not
under the non-applicable Directive 93/13/EEC, then under the respective
national laws as far as they provide for control of standard contracts or
contract terms as such in B2B relations.
F. Post-ContractualCancellation/Rescissionand Termination Rights
The European Community has no explicit power to regulate
remedies. The EC legal order is based on the premise that the material
rules of EC law are endorsed by remedies foreseen in the national legal
orders of the Member States. That is why, in principle, there should not
be a need to introduce EC specific remedies. Such an understanding
complies with the overall policy of the Commission not to interfere into
the basics of the national private legal orders. However, the story EC
contract law tells us is different. While it is correct that European
contract law has remained context bound, because Article 95 requires a
link between law-making and completing the Internal Market, the
European Commission managed to link to its context bound measures
appropriate EC law remedies. The outcome of this disparate policy
demonstrates a relatively consistent set of rules which might be united in
the perspective that contractual agreements should not tie the parties
together beyond what is necessary for effective competition. This is
where the concept of competitive contract law is abundantly clear.
The consumer contract law directives grant consumers two different
types of rights enabling them to get out of a contract-rights outside and
80. Recital 4 and 14 of Commission Regulation No. 1228/2003 on Conditions for
Access to the Network for Cross-border Exchanges in Electricity, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 1.
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8
beyond the traditional remedy of avoidance: 1

1. The right to rescission in case the product or the service is
defective, and
2. The right to cancellation (withdrawal from a contract), which is an
unconditional right in the sense that the consumer may simply change
his mind and decide to get rid of the binding arrangement.
The right to cancellation (withdrawal) is well established in the four
directives regulating the direct and distant selling arrangements and may
be inserted into the consumer credit directive which is under revision.
The overall legitimacy is taken from the particular circumstances under
which the contracts are concluded. They do not allow for the consumer
to compare prices and performance. The right granted, under the four
directives, to cancel the contract has to compensate the consumer's long
term involvement. Although numerous circumstances may explain why
a consumer changes his or her mind, the consumer must conclude the
contract long before it will be executed.
Usually, the consumer does not have to bear any consequences by
annulling the contract. In theory, such a regulatory model seems to be
the ideal type of competitive contract law. The consumer, even after
concluding the contract, may, on whatever basis, believe that he has
made an unfavorable decision and that better products and better
suppliers with more beneficial conditions are available. If so, the
consumer may withdraw from the binding arrangement and engage in a
better contract.
The second set of rights is bound to the existence of a defective
product-in the consumer sales Directive 99/44/EC--or defective
services-in the case of the package tour Directive 90/314/EEC and time
sharing Directive 94/47/EC. Here, obviously the starting point is
different. If the product bears a defect, there must be remedies granted to
consumers to compensate for these deficiencies. The consumer, in
principle, remains bound to the party with whom he has concluded the
contract. The consumer, however, may have a right to rescission. In this
case, the mutually exchanged performances have to be returned.
Whether and to what extent the consumer may use the right to rescission
for competitive purposes depends to a large extent on the set of legal
requirements the consumer must meet. If the standard is high, the
advantage is on the supplier's side, and if the standard is low, the
consumer might be in a better position to revise an uncomfortable
transaction decision.
81.

Reich & Micklitz, supra note 59.
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Both together, the unconditional right to withdrawal and the
comprehensive right to rescission, are not easily to be made compatible
with pacta sunt servanda. Legally, there may be justifications for each
and every particular context, in practice, the borderlines are sweeping.
Consumers tend to think that they are free to return the product and get
their money back, even if the product is not defective at all. Thus, there
is an overall trend to enlarge easily accessible rescission and cancellation
rights beyond the existing boundaries-and further undermine the
principle ofpacta sunt servanda.
It is the policy of the European Commission to cut down long-term
B2B contractual arrangements, be it via primary or secondary
Community law. Around the time of negotiating the Single European
Act in 1985 the European Commission launched an infringement
procedure against the Federal Republic of Germany because of its
restricted insurance law.8 2 The largely affirmative judgment paved the
way for cutting down long-term contractual arrangements either via the
competition articles or via secondary Community law in numerous
markets. 83
This overall policy is best reflected in the privatization directives.
Private contractual arrangements shall not be used to undermine the
Commission's policy of granting access to newcomers on the newly
established markets. If these newcomers are not "protected" against
market abuse, the whole policy may fail. The remedies enshrined in the
directives are shaped so as to match the Commission's policy. The most
invasive "remedy" is unbundling of transmission and distribution system
operators. It is not a private law remedy, but it has private law effects.
The second, more general remedy is condensed in the principles of
transparency and non-discrimination which are constantly reiterated in
Directive 2002/12/EC on universal services, Directive 2003/54/EC on
electricity, and Directive 2003/55/EC on gas. These directives have to
make sure that the access to the newly established market has to be kept
open and any long-term agreements between unbundled companies run
afoul to such a policy. More specific private law related remedies may
be found, for example, in regulation 1228/2003 on conditions for access
to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Again, the
particular context dominates the regulatory mechanism. As has already
been said, the regulation is meant to guarantee that tariffs for the crossborder transmission of energy are fair, cost-reflective, transparent and
82.

83.

Case 205/84, 1986 E.C.R. 3793.
See Case 125/03, Commission v. Germany, 2004 E.C.R. I-nyr (the ECJ held that

subsidies which have been granted under violation of EC law, have to be repaid, i.e., the
underlying contract has to be rescinded. In so far EC cartel law prevails over national
contract law).
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directly applicable. Therefore, transmission system operators shall
receive compensation for costs incurred as a result of hosting crossborder flows of electricity to their networks. Compensation payments
may be, if there is need, adjusted ex post. 84 Such a ruling, which is now
mandatory Community law, affects pacta sunt servanda, even if price
adjustments may be allowed in the national private law orders within
general principles of law.85
A similar concern arises in Regulation 1400/2000 on vertical
agreements in the motor vehicle sector. The EC legislature is concerned
with guaranteeing that termination rights are not misused to restrict
competition. That is why Article 3(5) allows the manufacturer to choose
between a five-year contract, which can be terminated in case of nonprolongation six months in advance, and an unlimited contract with the
right to terminate the contract at least two years in advance. While these
rules might be read as considering the interests of the manufacturer,
recital 9 makes it clear that the right to termination shall equally protect
the distributor or repairer:
In order to prevent a supplier from terminating an agreement because
a distributor or repairer engages in pro-competitive behavior, such as
active or passive sales to foreign consumers, multi-branding or
subcontracting of repair and maintenance services, every notice of
termination must clearly set out in writing the reasons which must be
objective and transparent. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the
independence of distributors and repairers from their suppliers,
minimum periods of notice should be provided for the non-renewal of
agreements concluded for a limited 86duration and for the termination
of agreements of unlimited duration.
The overall policy behind these termination rules is the intention to
guarantee competition. Contract law, in particular, long term agreements
shall not be used, neither from the supplier nor from the distributor or
repairer to hinder competition.
G. Effective Legal Protection
It is one characteristic of European law that the substantive law
cannot be separated from procedural law. EC law in general and contract
law in particular is "rights" based. These rights, however, have to be
enforced. The European Court of Justice has created a European legal
84. Art. 3(3) Commission Regulation No. 1228/2003 on Conditions for Access to
the Network for Cross-border Exchanges in Electricity, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 3.
85. See Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker, Good Faith in European
Contract Law 532, 546 (Cambridge University Press 2000).
86. 2002 O.J. (L 203) 31.
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order which is based not only on the availability of rights to the benefit
of consumers and business, but also on "effective" rights which need to
be enforceable. 87 The European Court of Justice has rooted the concept
legal protection of rights in the Convention on Human
of effective
88
Rights.
Article 153 of the Treaty of Rome may be interpreted as granting
consumers a right to information and a right to set up a consumer
organization. These "rights," however, need to be given shape by
secondary Community law. They do not stand for themselves. Without
any consumer contract law directives, the "rights" granted under Article
153 remain meaningless.
Passing the set of consumer contract law directives in review, the
set of unquestionable rights established de lege lata is impressive already
by now:
1.The right to transparency in contractual relations;
2. The right to information on the supplier, on the product/service and
on the contract; and
3. The right to cancel (withdraw) the contract and/or to rescind a
contract.
More challenging "rights" could easily be formulated. Is there
something like a "right" to be offered a fair contract? The European
Court of Justice has proven to be innovative and that is why the list of
unquestionable rights should not be regarded as a closed shop.
Ubi ius ibi remedium,89 where there is a right, there must be a
remedy, is the essence of the principle of effective judicial protection.
The right to effective legal protection is recognized as a common
principle of the European legal order and deserves no particular
codification in secondary Community law, which is deeply rooted in the
Human Rights Convention. The consumer contract law directives reflect
the quest for effective legal protection to a different degree. In the most
advanced version, Directive 2002/65/EC refers to sanctions that must be
"deterrent, proportionate and dissuasive." This wording goes back to the
European Court of Justice' case law in anti-discrimination matters. The
importance and the reach of the principle of effective legal protection in
relation to the unquestionable consumer rights is less clarified. Thus far,
87. See Reich, supra note 16, at 151, 162.
88. Case 222/84 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986
E.C.J. 1651, 1682.
89. Walter Van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures,37 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 501 (2000).
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the European Court of Justice has had few occasions to decide on
consumer contract law issues, but the few that have been decided
provoked strong reaction. The most controversial judgments turn around
the reach of the right to withdrawal under the doorstep selling directive. 90
The potential power of the right to information linked to the
principle of effective legal protection is being discussed more and more
in legal doctrine. 9 1 This is particularly important as the directives do not
further specify what sort of remedies the Member States must be made
available. Most recently Thomas Wilhelmsson has developed the
hypothesis that there is a general obligation under EC law to disclose
relevant contractual information. If the supplier fails to comply with
these requirements, the consumer is said to invoke that the contract has
no binding effect. Such a reading would reach beyond existing rights to
information as well as rights to cancel (withdraw) and rescind and grant
the consumer one overarching power to sanction a supplier who does not
comply with the law.
If information disclosure can and must be understood so as to serve
both ends of the transparency principle, contractual and competitive
transparency, then the potential of the emerging new paradigm comes
clearer and clearer. Information to be made available to the consumer at
the pre-contractual, the contractual, or the post-contractual stage could be
used by consumers to enhance competition not only before having
concluded a contract but also-at least to some extent-after having
concluded the contract.
The interrelationship between rights and remedies is less tight in
European business contract law, perhaps with the exception of Article 4
of Directive 99/44/EC. There is uncertainty at both ends, at the level of
enforceable rights and at the level of effective legal protection.
The right to transparency, the right to information, and the right to
terminate a contract exists-however, only in certain areas. These rights
are context related. Transparency is closest to becoming a legal
principle. Information rights play an ever increasing role. It would,
however, be too bold to start from a general right to information of
"weaker" suppliers towards "stronger" suppliers. Information rights
exist only in particular areas of European business contract law, where
90. Case 481/99, Heininger v. Bayerische Hypo and Vereinsbank AG, 2001 E.C.R.
1-9945; see also Case 350/03, Schulte 2005 E.C.R. 1-nyr at http://europa.eu.int.
91. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Private Law Remedies against the Breach of
Information Requirements of EC Law, in Reiner Schulze et. al., INFORMATIONSPFLICHTEN
UND VERTRAGSSCHLUSS IM ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 245-266 (2003); Hans-Peter
Schwintowski, Informationspflichtenund effet utile-A uf der Suche nach einem effektiven
und effizienten europdischen Sanktionssysem, in Reiner Schulze et. al.,
INFORMATIONSPFLICHTEN UND VERTRAGSSCHLUSS IM ACQUiS COMMUNAUTAIRE 267-290
(2003).
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privatization and liberalization has led to the establishment of new
markets for products or services. While there is a heavy impact on
cutting down long-term contracts mainly resulting from competition law,
there are only a few remedies available that grant rights to terminate
contractual relations. The three rights exist, as in consumer contract law,
but they are less stable and far away from becoming part of fully fledged
legal principles.
One notable exception may be reported from Directive 99/44/EC on
consumer sales. Article 4 strengthens the position of the final seller
against the resellers and the manufacturer. There is no agreement on
what Article 4 exactly means and whether it compels Member States to
introduce mandatory recourse systems. 92 However, one thing is for sure;
Article 4 implies that the final seller shall not bear the economic burden
alone resulting from a consumer who is marking use of his warranty
rights.
It is a common characteristic of all secondary Community law,
which is meant to open up markets, that it addresses first and foremost
the Member States. Whether and to what extent these public law based
privatization directives or regulations on block exemptions affect private
law relations is subject to a constant struggle between the Member States
and the Commission, as well as between the Member States and the
private parties. This is true for substantive law and it is all the more true
with regard to effective legal protection. Provisions in secondary
Community law, if there are any, are either directly aimed at protecting
the rights of private suppliers against regulatory actions of the public
authorities in charge to implement the liberalization rules or are unclear
with regard to its potential effect on private law relations between private
suppliers, i.e., companies. There is an overall contradiction between the
well-established overarching principle of effective legal protection and
its concrete shaping in the directives or regulations at stake
notwithstanding the addressee.
Nevertheless, several references may be found. They can broadly
be classified into two different categories. Either there are provisions,
like in Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on common rules for the
internal market in electricity and gas where it is not clear whether they
are addressed to the Member States, or there are no provisions at all as in
the regulations on block exemptions. Euro-speak hides the uncertainty
92. See Reich, supra note 16, at 160; see also G. Briiggemeier, Zur Reform des
deutschen
Kaufrechts-Herausforderungen
durch
die
EGVerbrauchergiuterkaufreichtlinie, Juristenzeitung 529 (2000); Ulrich Magnus, Der
Regressanspruch

des

Letztverkiiufers

nach

der

Richtlinie

uiber

den

Verbrauchersgiiterkauf,in Jurgen Basedow & Isaak Meier (eds.), Liber Amicorum Kurt
Siehr 431 (2000).
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on the potential addressee in the opaque concept of "sanctions," which
must be "effective, proportionate and dissuasive." In so far as the
respective provisions are more outspoken. Although the gas and the
electricity directives, Directives 2003/54 and 55/EC, do not really touch
upon "sanctions" and "effective legal protection," there is a European
complaint procedure 93-the complementary Regulation 1228/2203 on
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges refers to
"penalties" thereby reiterating the formula already known from Directive
2002/65/EC.9 4 There is some stretching necessary to derive from the
available rules on liberalized markets that the suppliers are given the
right to effective legal protection, not only against national enforcement
authorities but against the contracting partner.
The different regulations on block exemptions do not contain rules
on effective legal protection. There is no such formula as in Directive
2002/65/EC, not even a weaker or more hidden one. The reason might
be found in the decentralized enforcement of competition law, where
Member States' authorities have a more important role to play now.
This, however, does not fully explain why there is no reference to
effective legal protection at all. Maybe the reason lies in the impact of
the regulations on private law relations. If the legislator would have
picked up "effective legal protection," it would have had to define the
relationship between cartel and civil law, between the vertical
agreements and the implementing private law arrangements.
The
complete disregard for this makes it all the more important that the
principle of effective legal protection applies notwithstanding its
adoption in the secondary Community law. Its reach 95
has not yet been
action.
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V.

Stock Taking and Preliminary Conclusions

Some stock-taking might help to define where we are in European
contract law. It will have to be demonstrated that European consumer
contract law is no longer law in the books-it is becoming more and
more law in action. The subjects dealt with seem to be of minor
importance, but its practical impact is much broader. This is particular
true in countries which have decided to use consumer contract law as a
basic pattern for laying down fundamental principles for national
contract law as such.
European consumer contract law and European business contract
93.
94.
95.

See Directive 2003/54/EC, Art. 23(5).
Directive 2003/54/EC, Art. 12 and Regulation 1228/2003, Art. 12.
See Norbert Reich, The Courage-Doctrine: Encouraging or Discouraging

Compensationfor Antitrust Injuries? 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 35 (2005).
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law is and might remain for a long while incrementalistic.
Its
incrementalistic character shall not be underestimated, though. The
new" law bears "new" elements and these elements will grow
irrespective and independent from all efforts to draft a coherent and
systematic Common Frame of Reference. The legislatory machinery will
not come to a halt unless the European integration process itself would
be in jeopardy. And the European Court of Justice will keep the
development going. A constant stream of judgments directly or even
indirectly affecting European contract law pay tribute to the overall need
to give full effect to Community (contract) law-as the Court has put it.
A.

European Consumer ContractLaw

The presentation of EC contract law may be blamed for being onesided and for leaving aside counter-movements mainly in the European
consumer contract law. Instead, I would like to present the hypothesis
that it remains for the Member States to maintain a concept of contract
law which reaches beyond the emerging paradigm of competitive
contract law. That is why the Commission's intention to fully harmonize
consumer contract law deserves utmost attention.
The analysis here presented is mainly based on the texts and
documents of the European Community and the European Commission,
as well as on legal doctrine. The European Court of Justice had little
opportunity so far to raise its voice on the numerous issues. To
determine the state of the art, it seems indispensable to look into the
seven elements of competitive contract law separately:
1.Instrumental-protective device: there is little or no case-law at
hand where the Court has explicitly shaped the borderline between
consumer law and consumer protection law or between the
responsible and the weak consumer. Ocano has already been
mentioned. Here, the Court seems willing to go beyond the image of
the circumspect consumer which complies best with the concept of
competitive contract law.
2. Commercial communication and conclusion of contract: the
joining together of the two different fields of law might be the policy
of the Commission as recognized in legal doctrine. However, caselaw is largely missing. In Gabriel,96 the Court gave an explanation of
when a contract is concluded as a precondition to allowing one party
to take legal action against the other for fulfillment of
(complementary) obligations arising out this contract-conceming

96. Case C-96/00, Gabriel v. Schlank & Schick GmbH 2002 E.C.R./I-6367.
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gifts attached to a sale. Engler97 points into the same direction. All
in all, the Court seems willing to start from a broad understanding of
"contract" which leaves room for the integration of advertising.
3. Contractual and competitive transparency: while the Court has
identified the twofold dimension of the transparency principle, there
are no cases to be reported where the importance of the concept could
have been tested. In Axa Royale,98 the Court showed preparedness to
oblige the supplier to inform the consumer on his or her rights in
standard business conditions. The decision seems to be a promising
start for the hypothesis here defended-but no more than that.
4. Standard form contract via information duties: the key player
seems to be the legislator, i.e., the European Community and/or the
European Commission. The Commission demonstrates a growing
preparedness to advocate for the development of standard business
terms, however, not in B2C relations. Considerations to rely on
standardization institutions to play a key role within the new
approach type regulation failed.99
5. Fairness as market clearance: the challenge for the EU law will be
the notion of good faith and unfairness. So far, the Court had no
occasion to give its own understanding of what good faith in the EU
context could mean. Oc~ano has been read as if the Court seems
willing to protect the weak consumer and to enter into a concept of
contract law which reaches beyond competitive contract law. It
should not, however, be forgotten that in Ocbano the Court had to
decide on jurisdiction clauses which were prohibited in the indicative
list. So what the Court did was just market clearance. Thus, there is
no
contradiction
between
Oc~ano100
and
Freiburger
10 1
the
Court
refrained
from
submitting
Kommunalbauten,
where
standard business terms to a general fairness test. This task should
remain-according to the European Court of Justice-for the national
courts.
6. Post contractual cancellation rights: the key player certainly is the
European Court of Justice. In Dietzinger and Heininger10 3 the
97. Case C-27/02, Petra Engler v. Janus Versand GmbH, 2005 E.C.R. I-nyr.
98. Case C-386/00, Axa Royale Beige SA v. Geores Ochoa und Stratrgie Finance
SPRL, 2002 E.C.R. 1-2209.
99. In the context of regulating multi-level marketing there were efforts to involve
CEN and CENELEC.
100. Combined cases C-281/98 to C-244/98, Ocrano Grupo Editorial und Salvat
Editores, 2000 E.C.R. 1-4941.
101. Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten v. Hofstetter, 2004 E.C.R. I-nyr.
102. Case 45/96, Bayerische Hypotheken and Wechselbank AG v. Dietzinger, 1998
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Court caught legal doctrine by surprise. In these two cases the Court
has given shape to the right to withdrawal. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the European Court of Justice in Schulte10 4 and
Crailsheimer Volksbank 10 5 manages to withhold its strong
commitment to protect deceived consumers or whether it will stay
away and leave it for the Member States' courts to decide over the
concrete effects of the cases at issue. In terms of the concept of
competitive contract law, whether the Court is courageous enough to
go beyond competitive contract law or whether the Court will limit
EC law to set up a competitive environment which has to be fueled
by the national courts.
7. Effective legal protection: The European Court of Justice has not
had a chance to raise its voice with regard to effective legal
protection in consumer
affairs, perhaps with one promising
06
exception-Cofidis.1
As European consumer contract law will develop, the balance
between the EC concept of competitive contract law and Member States'
social justice based concepts can only be withheld if the European legal
order provides leeway for the Member States.
The Commission,
however, seems willing to abolish minimum harmonization and to insert
maximum harmonization as the necessary counterpart to the optional
European Civil Code.
It remains to be seen what maximum
harmonization really means.
There is ample evidence that even
maximum directives provide for escape rules or intermediary solutions.
In essence a new regulatory effort would end up in a reversal of the
burden of argumentation, i.e., contrary to minimum harmonization where
the Commission has to prove that Member States legislation reaching
beyond the minimum is incompatible with EC law principles, now the
Member States would have to justify if they deviate from maximum
standards. The policy shift from minimum to maximum harmonization
could become the breakeven-point for European contract law theory in
that it will decide over the degree to which Member States may defend a
concept of consumer contract law reaching beyond competitive
consumer contract law.

E.C.R. 1-1199.
103. Case 481/99, Heininger v. Bayerische Hypo and Vereinsbank AG, 2001 E.C.R.
1-9945.
104. Case 350/03, Schulte, 2005 E.C.R. 1-nyr.
105. Case C-229/04, Crailsheimer v. Volksbank, pending case.
106. Case C-473/00, Cofidis, 2002 E.C.R. 1-875.

2005]

THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVE CONTRACT LAW

B. European Business ContractLaw
The fields of European business contract law here presented have
not been the subject of litigation. A stock-taking of the Court's case-law
along the line of the seven elements would make no sense.
The only area where the Court had the chance to raise its voice is in
the commercial agents directive. Quite a number of rulings provide
evidence on the Court's preparedness to realize the protectiveinstrumental device inherent to the directive. It suffices to point to
Ingmar.10 7 Most of the directives analyzed have not yet led to case-law,
maybe because the directives are simply to young. If there is case-law,
such as Agostini, °8 it is focusing on the public law side of the respective
rulings. The same is true with regard to case-law dealing with the block
exemptions. The potential impact of the respective directives on
European private law and the potential resulting from the interplay of
rights and remedies needs to be discovered. The already existing caselaw in the field of consumer contract law might one day or the other
affect European business laws too, when it comes down to give shape to
the other six elements of competitive contract law.
Even if European business law still is in an infant stage, it should be
fully considered in the project of drafting a Common Frame of Reference
on European contract law. European business law, however, cannot only
be found in directives where the contractual bias is evident. European
business law may be discovered in rather strange areas, sometimes as a
mere by-product or in the disguise of secondary Community law which
does not indicate its private law impact. There is a simple lesson to learn
from my survey. It is not helpful to put established national categories
over the growing European business law. The European legislator
pursues an instrumental approach to each and every field of law. Private
law issues are covered either directly or indirectly-if there is need to
foster the completion of the Internal Market.

107. Case C-381/98, Ingmar Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., 2000 E.C.R. I9305.
108. Combined cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95, Konsumentenombudsmannen v.
Agostini F6rlag and TV-Shop i Sverige, 1997 E.C.R. 1-3843.

